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Abstract 
In classical party democracy, elections serve as an “instrument of democracy” (Powell 2000): they are 
the mechanism to connect policy preferences of the electors (within the electoral arena) to the political 
production (within the legislative arena). At the European level the linkage seems to be lost because 
the political actors performing in the two arena are not the same and the logics of behaviour are quite 
different. The EU calls for truly “Europarties” to become more democratic in its procedural and 
substantive prerequisites and this entails not only a progressive emancipation of party structures at 
European level but also an integration between them. In fact, we will have full Europarties only when 
the two party structures at EU level are either independent from national parties and linked to each 
other: if intra- and extra- parliamentary faces become really European and connected entities, 
legislators will be accountable to voters and, consequently, democratic deficit will decline. 
The main aims of this paper are, firstly, to investigate if and to what extent political parties at 
European level are able to perform the electoral and legislative functions in the two separated arena 
and, secondly, if intra- and extra- parliamentary faces of the Europarties are still separated or, rather, 
have become integrated. In other words, I will delineate the process of institutionalization of the 
Europarties looking at their progressive autonomy from national parties and systemness/integration at 
European level (Panebianco 1988). 
Keywords 
Europarties; institutionalization; democratic deficit; political parties 
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1. Political parties, political process and democratic deficit in the European Union 
The so called “Standard Version” of the European Union (EU) democratic deficit (Weiler et al. 1995; 
Follesdal and Hix 2006) claims that the legitimacy of the EU is questionable (at least) because, on one 
hand, the European Parliament (EP) is not able to control the EU executive and, on the other hand, 
political parties do not represent the European citizens will
1
 (Mair and Thomassen 2010). But if the 
latter can be accepted as effective problem of the EU institutional architecture, the lack of the EP to 
control the EU executive is a “false problem” because the EU is a political system where the executive 
and legislative powers are independent, hence as such the parliament has no role in scrutinizing and 
controlling the executive. It is like saying that because the Congress in USA is not able to dismiss the 
President, the United States suffers of a democratic deficit. Of course, it is questionable whether, to 
what extent and to whom the European Commission is accountable (Hix 2008) but this kind of 
investigation is not the focal point of this paper. Here I focus on the lack of political representation and 
in particular on the role of Europarties
2
 in this mechanism. 
The EU has gradually acquired the features of a “compound polity” (Fabbrini 2007)3 with a 
multiple separation of powers, both vertical (that is between the European institutions and member 
states) and horizontal (among the European Council, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Justice). Certainly, there are other “federal states” such as 
Germany, Austria, Canada or Australia with a vertical division of powers but what makes different the 
EU from these political systems is the simultaneous presence of the two lines of power separation: 
both horizontal and vertical. In the federal Germany, for example, the executive and legislative 
functions are fused together by the “vote of confidence” mechanism and consequently the executive 
must resign if it loses the majority support of the legislature
4
. Conversely, in compound democracy the 
executive and legislative are separated, the Cabinet is not able to disband the parliament and, in the 
same way, the government cannot be dismissed by the parliament. In a similar institutional 
architecture the political production is not tied to a government (like in parliamentary/fused system) 
but rather it is dispersed among different institutions sharing decision-making power. As a result, both 
in the EU and USA there is no government as such but rather a governance system where the political 
power is fragmented and dispersed among different institutions. In a compound democracy different 
institutions gain legitimacy by different electoral processes, on the basis of different timetable and by 
different constituencies. In other words, authoritative institutions are accountable to different 
principals and are constrained by different institutional arrangements but political parties are the main 
actors in all electoral processes. 
According to all these reasons, the democratic deficit in the EU is not to be found in the 
executive/legislative relation but rather in the absence of battle for controlling political power as well 
as the policy agenda at the EU level (Hix 2008). In classical party democracy, elections serve as an 
                                                     
1
 An upgraded “standard version” of the democratic deficit involves also three other claims: the first one is the absence of 
truly “European election”; the second one is the “too distance” of the European institutions from the citizens; the third 
one, finally, is the ”policy drift” from voters’ ideal points. For a more accurate analysis of these points see Follesdal and 
Hix (2006). 
2
 The concept of “Europarty” is often used in literature as synonymous of transnational federations that is they are 
considered as “Political Parties at European Level” following the definition of the “Party Statute”. In this paper, however, 
I used the term Europarty to indicate both the transnational federations and the European Parliamentary Groups.  
3
 To date the EU has been defined in several way: i.e. Hix (2005) defined the EU as a “political system without a State”, 
while Sbragia (2005) talked about a “reversed federal state”. The difficulties to define the EU reflects the difficulties in 
capturing its real political and institutional nature.  
4
 Besides the EU we have only two other examples of “compound democracy” in the world: the United States of America 
(USA) and Switzerland. But since “size matters” (Dahl and Tufte 1973) it is much better to compare the EU with the 
USA rather than with Switzerland (Fabbrini 2007). 
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“instrument of democracy” (Powell 2000): they are the mechanism to connect policy preferences of 
the electors (within the electoral arena) to the political production (within the legislative arena). At the 
European level the linkage seems to be lost because the political actors performing in the two arena 
are not the same and the logics of behaviour are quite different. While at election time national parties 
offer alternative programmes based on national issues to electors (and electors chose the party 
representing better their (national) policy preference
5
), during the legislative process the EPGs are 
involved in policy-making and their behavioural logic is (essentially) based on transnational and 
European issues (Hix et al. 2007, 2009). The separation between the two political processes at EU 
level creates a short-circuit in the “integrated electoral-parliamentary complex” (Cotta 1979) failing to 
represent the political will of the European citizens. If the EU wants this gap to be plugged it needs 
that truly Europarties act in the two political arena and coordinate their actions and strategies.   
The main aims of this paper are, firstly, to investigate if and to what extent political parties at 
European level are able to perform the electoral and legislative functions in the two separated arena 
and, secondly, if intra- and extra- parliamentary faces of the Europarties are still separated or, rather, 
have become integrated. In other words, I will delineate the process of institutionalization of the 
Europarties looking at their progressive autonomy and systemness (Panebianco 1988). The question of 
the emergence of fully-fledged and institutionalized Europarties, as we will see below, is a 
fundamental element to the development of an European representative democracy (Beetham and Lord 
1998)
6
.  
The paper will be organized in three parts. In the first one I develop a theoretical framework in 
order to understand the origin and the evolution of party politics at European level. Section two 
investigates empirically if and how the European party structures developed as organizations and if 
they are now autonomous from their counter-parts at national level. Besides, in this section I 
investigate if and to what extent the two faces of Europarties (the party in the public office – the EPG 
– and the party in the central office – the transnational party federations) are integrated and show some 
forms of coordination and cooperation. Finally, in the third part, I summarize the results and draw 
some conclusions.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2. Why do parties change? Adaptation and innovation of national parties 
Parties are "first of all organizations" (Panebianco 1988) and, consequently, the environment where 
they operate is one of the major source of uncertainty and pressure for changes. Namely, changes in 
the environment induce parties to modify both their organizational structures and strategies in order to 
maximize their votes, public offices and control over policies (Strom 1990) or, in more general terms, 
their power (Stoppino 2001). Parties in political science are generally considered as unitary actors with 
multi-goals and, in order to achieve these objectives, they organize themselves adapting to 
environmental “incentives structure” (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Panebianco 1988). So the logic 
behind this perspective is the next: 
parties  objectives  organization 
or following Chandler (1962): "structures follow strategy". It is clear, from this point of view, that the 
party organization depends on institutional framework which it is located in and, consequently, on the 
available “structure of political opportunities” (Schlesinger 1965). In more general terms, political 
                                                     
5
 Moreover, the electors very often vote on the basis of a judgment about their national governments.  
6
 In democratization literature is quite proved that party institutionalization is a vital factor in the process of democratic 
consolidation (Randall and Svasand 2002; Mainwarning and Scully 1995).  
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institutions affect parties by constraining their range of strategic options. Institutions rule out some 
types of behaviour and make others more or less likely by influencing the costs and benefits that a 
party can expect when following a certain course of action (Muller 2002). Since parties are offices- , 
votes- and policy- seeking organizations and because formal and informal distribution of power within 
them shapes how these goals are prioritized and pursued (Panebianco 1988; Strom 1990), political 
opportunity structure provides incentives for parties to organize in order to maximize their utility (that 
is their power). Therefore, if institutional environment shifts, political parties must adapt themselves to 
survive
7
.  
Appleton and Ward (1997) distinguished among different models of change and focused their 
attention on a particular type of adaptation: innovation. According to the authors this kind of change 
can be seen as an attempt by parties to introduce, within the existing organization, structures and 
processes radically new. Unlike adaptation, then, organizational innovation is a proactive process and, 
in this sense, organizational change is not a simply (passive) reaction to external events but it implies 
an active role of national parties. It should be noted that innovation does not necessarily entail 
replacing old forms and practices, in some cases it supplements what already exists. 
In my view, the concept of organizational innovation provides a useful analytical tool throughout 
we can understand origin as well as evolution of political parties at European level. In fact, we can 
consider both foundation and subsequent developments of parliamentary groups in the European 
Parliament (EPGs) as well as of transnational federations as an example of organizational innovation 
experimented by national parties in order to control resources and constrains produced by the EU.  
Moreover, this concept allows us to make a distinction between two different types of party 
response to the process of European integration: the first one is the "adaptation" to pressures that 
comes from the external environment and manifests itself (mostly) through organizational, ideological, 
programmatic and strategic changes of parties at national level; the second one concerns the 
organizational 'innovation' experienced by national parties at supranational level. Both the dynamics 
('adaptation' and 'innovation') are the two sides of the same coin: the 'Europeanization'.  
Put in another way, we can distinguish between europeanization of and by national parties: in the 
first case we have an adaptive response of national parties to the European integration process; in the 
second case, conversely, we have an organizational innovation experimented by national parties. 
2.1. Defining europeanization 
The concept of Europeanization has a contested meaning in literature and it has been used to describe 
different processes and dynamics. Olsen (2002) identified at least five different meanings of the term 
Europeanization: 
1. changes in external boundaries: this engages, for example, the process of EU enlargement to 
new territories and geographic areas; 
2. developing institutions at the European level: this signifies centre-building with “political 
production” capacity; 
3. central penetration of national systems of governance: europeanization implies adapting 
national and sub-national systems of governance to European political centre and European-
wide norms; 
                                                     
7
 I am conscious that parties answers to environment pressures are a product of an internal “power struggle” that involves 
different factions within it but, in this paper, it is my objective to place both origin and development of parties at 
European level within a general (macro) framework and to trace their evolution. It shall be a purpose of future researches 
to understand the differences in the level of institutionalization achieved by parties through an analysis of intra-party 
politics both within parties (at national level) and among parties (at European level).  
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4. exporting forms of political organization: Europeanization as exporting forms of political 
organization and governance beyond European territories; 
5. political unification project: the degree to which Europe is becoming a more unified and 
stronger political entity. 
Mair (2004; 2007) argued that each of these (potential) definitions of Europeanization focuses only on 
one side of the story while we might consider Europeanization as a two-way process, being both a 
source of change and an effect
8
. The first one describes the impact of the European Union on polity, 
politics and policies at national level and it can be considered as a top-down process, whereas the 
second one considers Europeanization as “the emergence and the development at European level of 
distinct structures of governance” (Risse et al. 2001, p.2) and it entails a bottom-up approach.  
This perspective of analysis therefore considers Europeanization not only as a passive response of 
Member State structures and processes to the European integration, but also as an attempt to model 
European procedures, institutions and policies. Thus, bottom-up concept of Europeanization is not 
alternative to the first dimension but, rather, complementary to it.  
In other words, “Europeanization” is a process consisting of two phases: the first one implies the 
institutionalization of a distinct European political system and institutions; the second one regards the 
penetration of European rules, directives and norms into national political systems (Mair 2007). But, if 
Europeanization might have two faces, these should not be seen as alternatives: each requires and is 
dependent upon other. Without the institutionalization of the EU there would be no impact on 
domestic structures because the EU would not have the strength and ability to penetrate national 
borders. By contrast, in the absence of any penetration into domestic sphere, the process of European 
integration might be simply considered irrelevant (Mair 2004, pp.342-343). 
2.2. Bottom-up Europeanization as organizational innovation 
Past researches analyzed if and to what extent national political parties adapted their organizational 
structure, political strategies and ideologies to the process of European integration. These studies, in 
particular, emphasized the limited impact of the EU on parties and party systems at national level 
(Mair 2000; Ladrech 2002; Raunio 2002, Pennings 2006; Poguntke et al. 2007). In our view, however, 
the evolution of the EU forced national political parties to adapt themselves not only through structural 
change at national level but also - and above all - through creation and development of party structures 
at European level. The EU integration process forced national parties to organize themselves at 
supranational level in order to control (relatively) new resources and to limit constrains created by the 
EU. So, if we want to speak about Europeanization we must talk about the bottom-up dimension of 
Europeanization. 
Figure 1 helps us to summarize our topic. The process of European integration changed the 
institutional environment where political parties operate, providing new incentives and constraints to 
achieve parties primary goals: offices, votes and policies. National parties in order to react to 
environmental changes implement both an adaptive and innovative organizational response. The first 
one concerns the structural, ideological and systemic changes of political parties at national level and, 
in literature, has been defined as 'top-down europeanization”. The second one, conversely, concerns 
the construction of organizational structures at European level by national parties. If parties at 
European level, both in their parliamentary (groups) and extra-parliamentary (transnational 
federations) dimensions, have been widely studied, their birth and evolution has never been considered 
in terms of 'bottom-up europeanization". 
  
                                                     
8
 For a similar definition of Europeanization see Bomber and Patterson (2000) and Hix and Goetz (2000). 
National Parties, Political Processes and the EU democratic deficit: The Problem of Europarties Institutionalization 
13 
Figure 1.Models of national parties europeanization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, political parties, one of the main channel of representation at national level, experimented new 
organizational forms in order to control as efficiently and effectively as possible new resources created 
by the EU integration process. Both the institutionalization of decision-making arenas and the 
delegation of decision-making powers, in a growing number of policy matters at supranational level 
(Franchino 2007), changed the environment where political parties and, more in general, national 
political systems act (Hix and Goetz 2000). This is particularly true for political parties, whose 
organizational structures, functions and strategies are strongly linked to different political institutions 
in which they are located and act (Panebianco 1988; Hix 1998). Therefore, the origin and evolution of 
political parties at European level are a consequence of the EU institutionalization.  
It is my belief, in particular, that origin and development of political parties at European level 
should be considered as the organizational response provided by the national parties to the process of 
European integration, which has produced a "restructuring of the main channels and forms of 
representation” (Bartolini 2005) and provides new resources and opportunities that parties should be 
able to exploit in the best way to maximize its usefulness. 
MEASURING THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
3. The institutionalization of the Europarties: variables and indicators 
In previous section I focused on why parties could innovate themselves as response to environmental 
change caused by European integration process. In this paragraph I turn my attention on development 
of party structures built at European level. In fact, innovation is not a choice once and for all but new 
party structures must solidify and adapt to environmental development during the time. This is 
particularly true for parties at European level since they operate within a “developing institutions” like 
the European Union and, because, as Bartolini (2005) wrote, “Europarties are the product of the 
institutional environment of the EU and have no hope of survival outside it. Their future development 
will be shaped by the EU institutional development”. 
In literature, organizational development has been defined “institutionalization” and it describes 
“the process by which organizations [...] acquire value and stability” (Huntington 1968). A definition 
of party institutionalization at European level must consider not only what makes an Europarty a more 
“valued and stable” institution, but also what makes it more specifically “European”. In other words, 
as pointed out by Bardi (2002) "not only must Europarties develop and consolidate their party 
character and attributes, but also do so by separating themselves from their national counterparts”. In 
other words, they have to become autonomous from national parties. In addition, a truly 
institutionalization of Europarties means also a progressive interdependence among party structures at 
European level: in particular, using the analytical tool proposed by Katz and Mair (1993), we can 
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consider as dimension of Europarty institutionalization the progressive integration between the “party 
in the public offices” (that is European parliamentary groups) and the “party in the central offices” 
(that is transnational federations)
9
. In other words, Europarties have to establish some forms of 
relationship among them in order to consolidate their party character.  
Consequently, and according to Panebianco (1988), we can identify two different dimensions of 
Europarty institutionalization: autonomy and integration. He defined autonomy as "the ability [of an 
organization] to control directly the processes of exchange with the environment" but, his definition 
refers exclusively to an organizational dimension of the process, while Randall and Svasand (2002, p. 
14) preferred to speak about "decision-making autonomy" defined as "freedom from [external] 
interference in determining their choices and strategies". In this way parties at EU level became 
structures free from interference in determining their own policies and strategies. Therefore Europarty 
autonomy reflects the degree of freedom from national parties from both an organizational and 
decisional point of view. More autonomous Europarty structures means more European parties, 
because the power within the organization shifts from national parties (unit-level) to European organs 
(central-level). In particular, autonomy means to parliamentary groups an independent decision-
making, without (or with limited) intrusion by national parties, while it refers to transnational 
federations not only to decisional autonomy but also to an organizational and financial 
independence
10
.  
The second dimension is based on the concept of systemness that Panebianco (1988) defines as "the 
degree of interdependence of internal sectors" and it has been designed to measure integration among 
various functional components of parties. Randall and Svasand (2002), in turn, described systemness 
as the “increasing scope, density and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a 
structure”, which in the case of political parties at European level are parliamentary groups and 
transnational associations. 
Therefore, what is important in Europarty institutionalization is, on one side, the growing 
autonomy of parliamentary groups and transnational federations from national parties and, on the 
other, their integration
11
.   
According to the particular nature of the EU system, the classic indicators applied to study political 
party institutionalization at national level (i.e. members, electoral volatility, stability) can not be used 
to analyze party organizational evolution at European level (Bardi 2002). Since EPGs and 
transnational federations are present in different institutional environment and they have different 
organizational models, it is necessary to identify ad hoc empirical tools for each of the two party 
structures at European level.  
3.1. The parliamentary groups 
Within the EPGs, decision-making is (predominantly) based on majority rule (Hix and Lord 2007; 
Corbett et al. 2007) even if during groups meeting MEPs and their national delegations try to achieve a 
                                                     
9
 In a similar vein, Duverger (1963), when outlined his models of party development (externally versus internally 
generated parties), agued that the final step in the process of party consolidation is, in both models, some kind of 
connection between intra and extra parliamentary faces of parties. 
10
 From the organizational point of view EPGs are already independent from national parties because European Parliament 
guarantee rooms, staff and others organizational tools to EPGs in proportion to their seats size.  
11
 Analytical focus in this paper will be placed on “structural dimension” of party institutionalization, that is on the process 
through parties consolidate as organization. Randall and Svasand (2002) suggested a second dimension through we can 
measure party institutionalization: the attitudinal one. For the two authors a party in order to consolidate itself must create 
– internally – its own distinctive culture and value-system and – externally – it has to be reified in the public imagination 
so that party exist as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders. This process of consolidation means that 
party is no longer only a tool in order to realize specific goals but that it becomes valuable in itself. 
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consensus as large as possible without the need to vote openly. The shared interest in taking decision 
without votes makes vague the identity of winners and losers reducing the problem of free-riding. In 
such an organizational setting it becomes really important the distribution of seats in order to control 
the decision-making process within the EPGs: if one (or two) national delegation(s) has (have) the 
majority of seats in group meeting the EPG is not truly “European” rather its decision making reflects 
the will and needs of the largest national delegation(s). Hence, the degree of decisional autonomy 
achieved by a parliamentary group may be measured by indicators able to quantify how much the most 
large national delegations within each EPGs are able to dominate decision-making. The reason to 
include in our analysis these kinds of indicators is suggested by Hix and Lord (1997) when they 
pointed out that EPP and PES include national delegations that individually account for about 30% of 
respective total group membership. Such strong delegations potentially have a high degree of national 
autonomy, making the EPGs less “transnational”. For this purpose I use two indicators: concentration 
and fragmentation.  
Concentration is considered as the proportion of seats held by the two major parties within a group. 
As it can be seen from table 1, the control exercised by the two major parties has declined over time 
even though there are still some groups where this condition persists, in particular the G/EFA 
(44.19%) and IND/DEM (45.45%). The three main groups (EPP, PES and ALDE) present a very low 
level of national party concentration if compared with the levels reported by other groups (respectively 
22.92%, 23.96% and 19%) describing them, from this point of view, as transnational groups. 
Table 1. European Parliamentary Groups concentration (1979- 2009) 
 
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
 A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Epp- De 39,3 67,3 37,3 61,8 26,4 48,8 29,9 49 22,8 38,3 14,3 24,01 13,89 22,92 
Pes 31 50,4 25,4 50,8 25,5 42,8 31,8 52 19,3 35,9 36,06 23,61 13,36 23,96 
Alde 42,5 55 38,7 54,8 26,5 44,9 23,3 41,9 21,2 34,6 17,91 28,35 10 19 
Uen - - - - - - - - - - 33,3 59,25 18,18 36,36 
G/Efa - - - - 26,7 53,3 52,1 69,6 19,6 34,8 32,5 47,5 30,23 44,19 
Gue/Ngl - - - - 50 71,4 32,1 57,1 26,2 42,9 17,91 33,3 17,07 29,27 
Ind/Dem - - - - - - - - - - 80 93,3 36,36 45,45 
Note: A = % largest party; B = % two largest parties 
Source: adapted from Bardi (2002) until 1999; author elaboration based on official EP data for years 2004 and 2009. 
In order to measure fragmentation it can be used Laakso and Taagepera’s index (1979)12 that counts 
parties weighting their relative powers throughout their number (percentage) of seats (of votes). In this 
case (and contrary to the classical interpretation of the index) the more effective number of parties 
within the EPGs increases the more the decision-making process is free from national influence since 
the relative power (in terms of seats) of each national delegation decrease. The index of fragmentation 
(IF) has been calculated as follow: 
IF = 1/ ∑i...n Si
2 
where Si represents the seats shared of parties i within the EPG. As it can be seen from table 2, the 
index increased over time – with the exception of UEN – describing a general rises in the level of 
transnationality of the EPGs. Even from the fragmentation point of view EPP, PES and ALDE emerge 
as the most «European» groups (with respectively 14.95, 13.62 and 14.45 effective number of parties). 
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 It can be useful to bear in mind that Laakso and Taagepera’s index has been used to measure the effective number of 
legislative (electoral) parties in a party system. 
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Table 2. European Parliament Groups fragmentation (1979- 2009) 
 1979- 1984 1984- 1989 1989- 1994 1994- 1999 1999- 2004 2004- 2009 
Alde 3,59 4,66 6,65 7,3 7,62 14,45 
Gue/Ngl 2,41 2,55 1,56 5,95 6,43 9,08 
Epp- De 4,38 5,27 6,2 7,8 7,77 14,95 
Ind/Dem   2,1 2,1 3,57 5,14 
Ni 2,61 2,79 3,57 3,3 3,38 6,42 
Pes 6,13 7,13 6,92 6,58 8,69 13,62 
Uen    2,8 3,3 3,19 
G/Efa   3,98 2,1 8,92 7,42 
Source: official EP sources. 
Another way to test the transnationality of the EPGs is to measure how many member states are 
represented in each group. Inclusiveness portrays the “Europeanness” showed by the EPGs: the more 
national delegations are included in the EPGs, the more they can differentiate themselves from 
national party interests diluting national identities and fostering the development of European party 
identities
13
. As table 3 shows, EPP, PES and ALDE are, once again, the groups where the greater 
number of countries is represented. Even if we take a diachronic perspective, it is easy to verify that 
these three groups have always been able to attract parties from most part of Europe. However, since 
1979 also the other groups, with the exception of UEN, have been aggregating parties from an 
increasing number of countries. 
Table 3. European Parliamentary Groups inclusiveness (1979- 2009) 
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
Epp- De 7/9 9/10 12/12 12/12 15/15 25/25 26/27 
Pes 9/9 9/10 12/12 12/12 15/15 23/25 25/27 
Alde 8/9 7/10 10/12 10/12 10/15 17/25 22/27 
Uen - - - - 6/15
 6/25 6/27 
G/Efa - - 7/12 7/12 12/15 12/25 14/27 
Gue/Ngl - - 4/12 5/12 10/15 12/25 14/27 
Ind/Dem - - - - 4/15 3/25 9/27 
Source: author’s elaboration based on EP official data. 
Overall, the three indicators suggest a development of the parliamentary groups and a gradual 
emancipation from national parties becoming more and more true European entities separated from 
their national sub-units. In addition, decision-making within them appears to be no longer an 
expression of the major parties will but it has become a bargaining process involving all of them. 
Obviously it doesn’t mean that no national delegation can carry out a leading role within the EPGs but 
if they do this it is for political reasons. For example, English Labour Party or German SPD have a 
leading role within the PES but their pivotal position is related to their political and social resources 
both at national and international level.  
In summary, the more an EPG a) is fragmented; b) includes an increasing number of nationalities; 
and the less c) has a concentration of power in one or two national parties, the more decisional 
autonomy it has and, consequently, the more it is institutionalized. However, an EPG with a high 
degree of decisional autonomy (in accordance to the suggested indicators) can meet heavy problems in 
acting as unitary actor. In fact, if the numbers of national delegations increase and if the EPG has weak 
party leadership without discipline tools, it will become tricky for it achieving shared decision and 
voting as a block. Moreover, the EPGs try to increase their size in terms of seats as much as possible 
in order to obtain greater economic resources, staff and offices (Corbett et al. 2007; Hix et al. 2007). 
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 This indicator is similar to the concept of “value infusion” described by Randall and Svasand (2002) in their model of 
party institutionalization.  
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This strategy, however, risks to undermine the ideological cohesion of groups and their ability to vote 
as a block and, therefore, their capacity to influence decision-making process at EU level. Probably a 
trade-off exists between the process of trans-nationalization of groups and their ability to maintain 
internal coherence and cohesion, especially during parliamentary votes. For these reasons it is 
important to investigate whether the EPGs act as unitary actors (expressing a transnational and 
autonomous identity) or whether their behaviour follows a national strategy.  
The cohesion in voting behaviour, that is how much each national delegations within each group 
vote in the same way, is a useful indicator to measure how much EPGs are able to operate as unitary 
actors within the EP. Cohesion makes independence of parties at European level “truth in its 
consequences” (Thomas 1928) or, in other words, using this indicator we can see if national 
delegations are either agent of national parties or EPGs. 
As I argued before, growing decisional-autonomy of the EPGs can have «negative externalities» on 
the ability of groups to act as a block especially in voting behaviour. In literature several indexes have 
been used to measure the degree of party unity during the votes in parliamentary assemblies in general 
and within the EP in particular
14
. In this paper I will use the «Agreement Index»
15
 elaborated by Hix et 
al. (2007) as follow:  
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where Yi denotes the number of YES votes expressed by group i on a given vote, Ni the number of No 
votes and Ai the number of Abstain votes. The AI will be equal to 1 when all members of an EPG vote 
in the same way, on the contrary it will be equal to 0 when the MEPs of a party are equally divided 
among all three voting options. In this way we can measure if EPGs work (vote) as autonomous and 
independent actors (high level of voting cohesion) or if national delegations within EPGs act 
independently from each other.  
As it can be seen from table 4, EPGs unity, despite several institutional obstacles (i.e. the lack of 
vote of confidence or the selection of candidates for the European elections
16
), has increased over time 
making EPGs stronger and more cohesive than their counterparts present, for example, in the U.S. 
Congress (Martinelli 2006). The data show clearly that all groups increased their cohesion during 
various legislatures, reaching in the case of PES a cohesion of 0.91. The only exceptions to this 
positive trend are UEN, which saw its level of internal cohesion decreasing from 0.85 in 1994 to 0.76 
in 2005, and IND/DEM, whose index has declined during the last three terms from 0.67 to 0.47. On 
the whole, figures in table 4 show a high level of cohesion (about 0.81) especially if we take into 
consideration institutional and organizational obstacles that groups meet in fulfilling its functions and 
successive waves of enlargement producing, at least in the short term, difficulties in the adaptation 
process of parties from new member countries. However, also declining ideological homogeneity 
inside the groups (as a result of expanding group membership) this does not seem to have a negative 
effect on voting cohesion (Hix et al. 2007).  
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 For a review of this kind of literature see, inter alia, Bowler et al. (1999) and Kam (2009). 
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 See Carrubba et al. (2006) and Hug (2010) for theoretical and methodological critics to the employment of indexes of 
cohesion within the EP.  
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 For a detailed analysis of factors that obstacle EPGs cohesion see Hix et al. (2007). 
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Table 4. European Parliamentary Groups cohesion (1979- 2009) 
 1979- 1984 1984- 1989 1989- 1994 1994- 1999 1999- 2004 2004- 2009 
Pse 0,76 0,87 0,90 0,90 0,90 0,91 
Epp- De 0,90 0,93 0,91 0,90 0,87 0,88 
Alde 0,85 0,85 0,85 0,86 0,88 0,89 
Gue/Ngl 0,81 0,87 0,86 0,80 0,80 0,85 
Uen 0,80 0,84 0,85 0,79 0,75 0,76 
G/Efa - 0,81 0,85 0,91 0,92 0,91 
Ind/Dem - - 0,83 0,67 0,50 0,47 
Ni 0,74 0,79 0,81 0,63 0,44 0,44 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from Hix et al. (2009). 
A possible explanation of this growing cohesion lies in the resources controlled by the EP parties, 
which encourage MEPs to toe the party line. The EP parties control the nominations for the key offices 
of the EP, the appointment of Committee chairpersons, offices within groups, rapporteurships on EU 
legislation and the agenda of the parliament as the whole. MEPs have learned that the likelihood of 
their playing an influential role in the EP is dependent upon the EP parties and hence they join a 
political group that broadly shares their policy preferences. The result is that «national parties might be 
forced to vote against their policy preferences on some issues, but on average will vote according to 
their policy preferences in the knowledge that they are more likely to achieve these preferences as 
their colleagues in the group will be voting the same way» (Hix et al. 2009). Therefore, parliamentary 
groups have been able to maintain and even increase over time its cohesion in voting behaviour 
despite growing number of national parties inside them. In other words, EPGs became somewhat 
different from national parties both from an organizational and behavioural point of view.  
3.2. Political Parties at European Level 
The origin of the Political Parties at European Level (PPEL) can be traced at the 1969 European 
Community Summit in The Hague when member states leaders decided to hold direct elections to the 
EP
17
. PPEL were launched just before the first EP elections in 1979 and their primary goals were the 
coordination of the European election campaigns and the adoption of a common electoral programs. 
Moreover, the founding fathers of the PPEL sought (and hoped) that they would have operated as the 
“extra-parliamentary arm of the EP groups in terms of support, control and influence” (Pridham and 
Pridham 1981). But, as this and the next sections will show, Europarties were (and they are still) too 
weak and loosely organized to successfully achieve the goals outlined above. 
Once again, we have to identify some useful indicators in order to measure the degree of 
organizational and decisional autonomy achieved by Europarties since their foundation. From political 
parties literature and organizational theory we can pinpoint (at least) the following indicators: 
inclusiveness, staff and financial development and majority rule within the main party leadership 
bodies. Inclusiveness allows us to highlight the more or less European character of federation or, in 
other words, it makes possible to investigate whether parties at European level differentiated 
themselves from national party values and preferences: the more nationalities are in Europarties, the 
more they are transnational, and consequently the less they are bound to specific national interests. 
Staff and financial development, conversely, describe the structural independence from national 
parties and, in particular, they affect the power-balance among parties at European level and national 
parties and they show to what extent the original predominance of national parties has been reduced in 
favour of the European parties. Finally, decisional autonomy can help us to understand whether 
national parties are still able to control decision-making process within Europarties. In particular, if 
Europarties preserve unanimity as the main voting rule in key decisional bodies then each national 
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 Pridham and Pridham (1981) argued that without the immediate stimulus and practical pressures resulting from the 
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party maintains a pivotal role within them; otherwise, using majority rule national parties lose their 
control over Europarty decisions.  
From data in table 5 we can identify three types of Europarties. The first one consists of those 
associations as EPP-ED, PES, ELDR and EGP, that have been able to embrace a growing numbers of 
parties and nationalities. The second type includes those federations such as the EDP, EUD and AIDE 
with a very limited ability to include new member parties (less than 8 countries are represented within 
them). Finally, we find between them the EFA, AEN and EL gathering parties from (around) 12 
countries. An interesting feature is the total number of countries, including external states to the EU: 
the ELDR and EGP are composed by parties from European as well as non-EU countries, while the 
other federations seem to stop at the borders of Europe. While, at first glance, the ability of federations 
to attract non-EU countries may appear a positive factor, actually it risks to become an obstacle in the 
integration process between the two party structures at European level. The presence of non-EU 
parties within federations, especially if these parties have the right to vote in decision-making bodies, 
avoids the faculty of federations to interact with EPGs since parties outside the EU (obviously) are not 
represented within the EP and consequently the EPGs consider federations as organizations with any 
legitimacy. Why an EP groups composed by (exclusively) European parties should accept decision 
from an organization composed (also) by non-European parties? In such a condition intervention from 
outside is more likely to be regarded as interference than as assistance or positive factor. 
Table 5. Parties at European Level inclusiveness (2009) 
Federation N. parties EU parties EU countries Total countries 
Epp 39 39 (100%) 24/27 24 
Pse 33 32 (96,96%) 26/27 27 
Edp 7 7 (100%) 7/27 7 
Eldr 45 34 (75,55%) 20/27 29 
Efa 30 30 (100%) 12/27 12 
Aen 16 14 (87,5%) 13/27 15 
El 17 15 (88,23%) 13/27 15 
Egp 33 28 (84,84%) 25/27 30 
Euda 6 6 (100%) 6/27 6 
Aideb 6 6 (100%) 6/27 6 
Notes: a EUD has representatives in two different groups: ALDE and Non Attached.         
        b Aide disbanded at 30 December 2008 then data refer to 2008. 
Source: official data from European Parliament and Europarty Statutes; figures concern only full member parties. 
From the financial point of view the turning point is the adoption of the “Party Statute” in 2003. The 
main aim of the Statute (and its later amendments) was to improve, throughout a “direct public 
funding”, the organizational autonomy of parties operating at EU level, creating the legal and financial 
basis for Europarties to become really «important factors [...] to forming an European awareness and 
to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union» (TEU, art.191). Since then, parties at 
European level have been receiving growing subventions from the EP – they have more than doubled 
their total grants in the last four years (see table 6) (total grant increased from 4.647.157€ in 2004 to 
10.339.866€ in 2008) – favouring a deeper independence from national parties. In particular, if we 
think that Europarties, in their early phase, relied on resources of their respective EP party groups and 
national members to carry out their day- by- day tasks, the public founding – even if insufficient to 
guarantee a truly independence from national parties – makes possible for them building their own 
political structures. To EPP president Wilfried Martens the Regulation meant that the “EPP can 
function as it was intended to when it was founded 25 years ago, as a genuine transnational party” 
(quoted in Johansson 2009, p. 167). In other words, although we are still far from having effective and 
autonomous political parties at European level, the foundations have been laid with Party Statute. 
However, the quite positive picture provided by table 6 is counter-balanced by two provisions 
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subordinating Europarties to national parties and parliamentary groups
18
. The first one, contained in 
the Party Statute, binds Europarties to co-financing at 25% the subventions from the EP making 
national parties the most relevant and indispensable source to obtain the remaining 75% because 
national parties are the only actors able to found a similar amount of economic resources. Hanley 
(2007) went so far as to argue that Europarties are currently poorer and worse equipped than before as 
a result of the Regulation and this forced Europarties to enlarge their membership fees (Day and Shaw 
2006) increasing Europarties’ financial dependence on national parties. In more general term, this 
provision in the Party Statute tied Europarties to political parties at national level hindering their 
process of independence: Europarties alone are not able to raise the enough amount of funds required 
by the rule and, as a consequence, national parties become the conditio sine qua non Europarties can 
use and spend their money. The second one, provided in the implementation rules, subordinates 
Europarties to the EPGs because funds for parties at European level are taken from EP’s budget.    
Moreover, from table 6 a clear disparity emerges in the distribution among political parties: in fact, 
over 70% of grants is allocated to the three major parties (EPP, PES and ELDR). At the same time 
(and in consequence of), growing financing creates the opportunity for parties at European level to 
maintain a growing staff- structure (see table 7) that allows day-by-day administrative and political 
activities of federations. Table 7 shows that especially EPP and PES developed substantially in their 
workforces: they increased permanent staff from 5 units in 1979 to (respectively) 19 and 18 units in 
2009. The Liberals, in contrast, enlarged of only 3 units their administrative staff in thirty years. EGP 
and EL show a very low level of administrative autonomy with just 2 and 3 employees.  
In general, the figures in table 6 and 7 give back a condition in which Europarties have little 
chances to increase their organizational and financial autonomy from national parties in particular if 
we compare their conditions with those of political parties at national level. However, if we take into 
account a diachronic perspective we can find a (modest) evolutionary trend that describes parties at 
European level as “developing organizations”: they moved from a situation of “embarrassingly low” 
(Bardi 1994) numbers of paid staff to a condition of “just low” organizational structure.  
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Table 6. Grants from EP to Parties at European Level 
 2004 % 2005 % var.% 2006 % var.% 2007 % var.% 2008 % var.% 
Aen 161.250 3,47 450.000 5,42 +179.06 450.000 4,88 0 300.000 2,94 33,33 300.000 2,90 0 
Efa 165.724 3,57 217.906 2,62 +31.48 222.627 2,41 2,16 222.541 2,18 -0,04 226.600 2,19 1,82 
Egp 306.000 6,58 568.261 6,84 +85.70 581.000 6,3 2,24 631.750 6,2 8,73 641.534 6,20 1,55 
El 210.275 4,52 365.868 4,4 +73.99 518.626 5,62 41,75 526.148 5,16 1,45 536.685 5,19 2,00 
Edp 340.425 7,33 459.530 5,53 +34.98 514.797 5,58 12,02 526.148 5,16 2,2 496.291 4,80 -5,67 
Eldr 618.896 13,32 894.454 10,77 +44.52 883.500 9,57 -1,22 1.133.362 11,12 28,28 1.115.665 10,79 -1,56 
Epp 1.587.587 34,16 2.863.693 34,47 +80.38 2.929.841 31,75 2,3 3.271.810 32,09 11,67 3.354.754 32,44 2,54 
Pes 1.257.000 27,05 2.489.175 29,96 +98.02 2.580.000 27,96 3,64 2.994.603 29,37 16,07 3.027.647 29,28 1,10 
Aide / / / / / 328.125 3,56 / 356.250 3,49 8,57 413.990 4,00 16,21 
Eud / / / / / 219.825 2,38 / 234.000 2,29 6,45 226.700 2,19 -3,12 
Totale 4.647.157 100 8.308.887 100 78,80 9.228.341 100 11,07 10.196.612 100 10,49 10.339.866 100 1,40 
Note: var.% represents the percentage variation in the EPGs grants from the previous year.  
Source: official data from European Parliament. 
Table 7. Parties at European level’s full- time staff 
ANNO Epp Pes Eldr Efa El Aen Aide Eud Edp Egp 
1979- 1984 5 5 4 - - - - - - - 
1985- 1989 7 7 6 - - - - - - - 
1990- 1994 10 13 6 - - - - - - - 
1994- 1999 10 12 7 - - - - - - - 
2009 19 18 7 8 3 N.D. 1 6 6 2 
Fonte: 1979- 1999 Hix (2002b); 1999- 2009 official Europarties data. 
Fabio Sozzi 
22 
Autonomy from national parties at European level is a game that has to do with both structural and 
decisional dimension of party organization. In fact, without an independence in terms of structure it is 
impossible for a federation to take decisions with no intrusion by national parties. Therefore, as a 
consequence of low level of organizational and financial autonomy of the PPEL, we aspect that also 
decisional autonomy will be low. A possible way to understand the extent of Europarties decisional 
autonomy could be to investigate: a) if majority rule is applied in the key decision-making bodies, b) if 
their decisions are compulsory for member parties and c) if Europarties allow individual membership 
(with voting right). It is probably that the introduction of these rules within PPEL reduces, on one side, 
capability of national parties to control decision-making and, on the other side, it makes decisions 
taken at European level much more “European”. 
Although, on the one hand, table 8 displays that only the EL maintains unanimity as decision-
making rule, while within the EPP, EGP and PES decisions are taken with an absolute (or qualified) 
majority and, the EFA, ELDR, EUD and EDP are based on simple majority; on the other hands, only 
three PPEL (EFA, ELDR and EDP) produce decisions that are binding for member parties. Hence, if 
we look at the level of decisional autonomy the picture is not so comfortable: Europarties are still 
organizations where sub-unities exercise a predominant role, but if we look at a diachronic perspective 
(see table A in appendix for a historical comparison) we can see that during the ’90 all PPEL adopted 
decisions by unanimity and they were able to make only non- binding recommendations. Therefore, 
once again, the figures displayed in table 8 describe PPEL as “developing organizations”.  
With regard to individual membership it is presently allowed in all PPEL but, first of all, individual 
members compose a mere “marginal minority”19 and, secondly, they lack voting rights in the main 
decisional bodies. As a consequences, national political parties maintains a leading role within the 
Europarties: they influenced the decision- making process, they are not obliged to follow decisions 
taken by Europarties and individual membership is still a national matter. In sum, national parties 
remain the only practicable route of political participation within the EU.  
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 The ELDR still does not have any registered individual members, while EPP has only 120 members and EGP has 1300 
supporters. PES in 2006 introduced the figure of “PES activist” permitting to individual member of national member 
parties to participate in PES activities (i.e. to participate at PES Congress, to take part in drafting PES manifesto). “PES 
activists” are primarily internet- based and its main goal is to linked PES with national parties on the ground. Currently 
there are 1200 activists registered. 
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Table 8. Decisional autonomy of parties at European level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: a) individual may be exceptionally accepted by the General Assembly (art. 5c) and they shall have only a consultative 
vote. 
 b) simple majority of votes express . 
 c) without voting right. 
 d) whether at least one third of the full members are present. 
 e) whether at least half of the members are present. 
 f) all MEPs of the EPP Group elected in a party member list are also ex officio members of the Party. 
 g) votes are valid only if (at least) half of the votes are in favour. 
 h) qualified majority requires 75% of the votes cast and votes are done only if at least 2/3 of the full 
 member parties are present. 
 i) at least 1/3 of the members must be present. 
Source: official Statutes of Parties at European level. 
PPEL bodies 
autonomy 
decision-making rule binding membership 
EFA 
General Assembly simple majorityb 
YES YESa 
Bureau simple majorityb 
ELDR 
Congress simple majorityd 
YES 
YESc  Council simple majorityd 
Bureau simple majoritye - 
EL  
Congress unanimity 
NO YES Council of Chairpersons unanimity 
Executive Board unanimity 
EPP 
Presidency absolute majoritye 
NO YES  Political Assembly absolute majoritye 
Congress absolute majoritye 
EGP 
Congress absolute majoritye 
NO YESf 
Council 2/3 majorityg 
Committee 2/3 majority 
PES 
Congress 
qualified majorityh in 
political matters; simple 
majority in administrative 
and organizational matters 
NO YESf Council 
Presidency 
EUD 
Congress simple majority 
NO YESc  
Board simple majority 
EDP 
Congress simple majorityi 
YES 
YES Council simple majority
i 
Presidency simple majority - 
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4. Integration between groups and federations 
Before starting the empirical analysis of the integration between EPGs and Europarties is necessary to 
spend some words in order to better specify what I mean with the concept of integration and why it 
can be considered a (possible and partial) solution to the lack of electoral connection at European 
level. First of all, integration does not mean dependence or subordination of one structure to the other, 
that is EPGs and transnational federations must be considered as a functional separation of only one 
thing: Europarties. This idea is based on conviction that parliamentary groups (at national level as well 
as at European level) guarantee the necessary continuity of two distinct political processes within 
legislatures: the first one is the “power struggle” having as the main goal the achievement of “political 
authority”; the second one is the process that leads to the political production of “guaranteed 
conformity” (i.e public policies, civil rights, national security etc..)20. In the former, the key actor is the 
extra-parliamentary face of parties which competes for authority offices (i.e. parliamentary seats, 
government and so on...) while, in the later, parliamentary groups (especially in parliamentary 
systems) fulfil primary role in the political production. Therefore, the more the two faces of political 
parties are integrated the more are the two processes and consequently citizens have much more 
possibilities to sanction (reward) bad (good) legislators
21
. At the same time, however, the two 
structures (at least) have to “work in tandem” in order to make possible the “integrated electoral- 
parliamentary complex” (Cotta 1979): parliamentary groups must be the political weapon of parties in 
the central-office. 
It is possible to isolate some specific indicators that can help us to understand the level of 
systemness. The first one concerns de jure attendance of the EPGs in central party bodies or, 
conversely, of federations representatives in group meetings. The second one is the formal recognition 
by each PPEL of a specific EPG as its official representative within the EP. Finally, another way to 
look at party integration can be to explore how much parties belong, at the same time, to EPG and to 
the associated PPEL. This indicator seems to be useful to measure the degree of integration between 
the two key European party structures because, as we have argued above, one of the main problems 
that federations meet in their integration process with parliamentary groups lies on non- coincidence of 
member parties: EPGs very often consider transnational federations as “foreign bodies” since the latter 
are composed by parties that have little or nothing to do with the national parties within the EPGs.  
As table 9 shows, Europarties and EPGs are still separated tables: only four Europarties (the EPP, 
EDP, AEN and EFA) impose to its members (parties or MEPs) to belong to the same parliamentary 
group, all the others allow to join different EPGs, making much more intricate the cooperation with 
parliamentary structures. Moreover, the EL and EUD don’t have in their Statute any link with a 
specific EPG. For example EL Statute states that “[EL] cooperates closely with parliamentary groups 
of the Left in other EU bodies”. In addition, PPEL have no representatives in group meetings, while 
groups agents can belong to the key decision-making bodies even if (very often) without voting rights. 
In fact, some PPEL such as the EPP, PES, EGP, EDP and ELDR guarantee to EPGs representatives to 
take part in Congress with voting right but, at the same time, their statutes don’t include EPGs 
delegates in restricted bodies (i.e. in Political Bureau or Presidency) or, if they, delegates cannot vote. 
Obviously, attending in Congress has a symbolic mean but at the same time, since they convene every 
four years and elaborate political programs that are ideological platforms based on general principles, 
it is not able to influence the PPEL day-by-day activities and political strategies. In fact, it is in 
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 The discussion that follow is strongly influenced by political theory elaborated by Stoppino. See Stoppino (1994, 2001) 
and for a partial application of his theory to the European Union case see Bartolini (2005). 
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 Autonomy and independence of parliamentary groups represents also a shield against institutional overflow of extra- 
parliamentary power struggle guaranteeing more stability to the government. For example, the high government 
instability in Italy can be considered as a (partial) consequence of the low level of parliamentary groups’ autonomy from 
“parties in the central offices” (Gatti 1984, Fedel 2010).  
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restricted political bodies where significant political decisions are taken and within them EPGs 
representatives do not attend in any case with voting right.  
The position of Europarties is still further complicated if we look at parties belonging, at the same 
time, both to the EPGs and federations. From figures in the third column of table 9 we can see that 
EPP, PSE and EDP are federations overlapping their own EPG. In this way, they seem to be high 
integrated party structures. Otherwise, the ELDR and EGP present a very low level of integration 
reaching respectively only 57,77% and 42,42% of party coincidence
22
.  
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 A similar picture emerges if we take into account what Calossi (2011) called “europartitization” that is the number of 
MEPs belonging to the same Europarty. 
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Table 9. Europarties integration 
PPEL bodies 
integration 
representation collaboration parties in EP 
EFA 
General 
Assembly 
- MEPs submit a report on their activities same group or 
 sub-group 
4/30 (13,33%) 
Bureau - MEPs without right to vote 
ELDR 
Congress - MEPs without right to vote 
ELDR's group 
 in the EP 
26/45 (57,77%) Council - 1 delegate from EPG 
Bureau - President and Secretary-General of EPG 
EL  
Congress - MEPs without right to vote 
cooperating closely  
with parliamentary  
groups of the Left  
in other EU bodies 
7/17 (41,17%) 
Council of 
Chairpersons 
- 
Executive 
Board 
- 
EPP 
Presidency 
- President of the EP and Chairman of EPP 
Group in the EP with right to vote 
EPP’s group  
in the EP 
34/39 (87,17%) 
- Secretary-General of the EPP Group 
 in the EP 
 Political 
Assembly 
- Members of the Presidency of EPG; members 
of the Presidency of the EP; Presidents of 
national delegations of member parties of EPG 
with right to vote 
- Secretary-General of EPG without right to 
vote 
Congress 
- MEPs who are "Individual Members" with 
right to vote 
- MEPs who are not "Individual Members" 
without right to vote 
EGP 
Congress 
- MEPs who are "Individual Members" with 
right to vote 
close cooperation  
with Green Group  
in the EP 
14/33 (42,42%) 
- Members of the Bureau of the EPG without 
right to vote 
Council 
- 4 delegates of the EPG with right to vote 
- Members of the Bureau of the EPG without 
right to vote 
Committee  
PES 
Congress 
- representative from national delegation of 
EPG with right to vote 
PES’ group 
in the EP 
25/33 (75,75%) 
- MEPs from EPG without right to vote 
Council 
- representative of EPG equal to 25% of the 
national delegations with right to vote 
- delegation of EPG equal to 25% of its total 
members 
Presidency 
- President of EPG with right to vote 
- President of EP without right to vote 
EUD 
Congress - 
any mention 1 + 1/6 (16,6%) 
Board - 
EDP 
Congress - MEPs members of EDP with right to vote 
cooperation  
with EPG 
5/7 (71,42%) Council - 
Presidency - 1 delegate for each national delegation in EPG 
Source: Europarty Statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
5. Still separated tables still democratic deficit: the failure of political parties at European level. 
Modern democracy requires representation and parties become the only feasible instrument to realize 
democratic requirements. Schattschneider (1942) was really clear and unequivocal when stated that 
“modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties”. In the same way the EU calls for truly 
“Europarties” to become more democratic in its procedural and substantive prerequisites and this 
entails not only a progressive emancipation of party structures at European level but also an 
integration between them. In fact, we will have full Europarties only when the two party structures at 
EU level are either independent from national parties and linked to each other: if intra- and extra- 
parliamentary faces become really European and connected entities, legislators will be accountable to 
voters
23
 and, consequently, democratic deficit will decline. 
In this paper I argued that one dimension of democratic deficit affecting the European Union can be 
found in the lack of ability of Europarties to discharge the representative function at the European 
level. Put in another way, the democratic deficit is (principally) linked to the weakness of political 
parties at the EU level and in particular to their ability to connect the electoral and legislative arena. 
The empirical analysis showed how the EPGs have become much more “European” entities different 
from national parties. Now the EPGs are able to take their decision without a systematic intrusion of 
national parties and, more important, they operate as cohesive actors during the legislative process. 
This positive picture is counter balanced by the narrow development manifested by transnational 
federations: from all points of view (here discussed) the federations are still weak organizations 
controlled by national parties and, moreover, the integration between the two faces of the Europarties 
are really limited. The EPGs and federations are still two “separate tables” failing to connect the two 
political processes at European level. In other words, Europarties are now much more autonomous 
organization than in the past (especially the EPGs) but we cannot speak yet of truly and completely 
institutionalized Europarties because they don’t still achieve a condition of systemness. Certainly, this 
condition is strictly connect to the fact that the EP elections have in this moment very little do to with 
“Europe”. National elections are about national executive, fought by national parties and over 
national issues. What is necessary at this point is not another institutional change but rather, as Hix 
clearly argued in his work (2008), ad hoc changes in “informal practices and formal rules of procedure 
that govern the way the EU institutions works” in order to “inject more political competition into EU 
political process”. The possibility for the EU to become a “democratic” political system and to 
decrease its lack of legitimacy is strictly related to political party institutionalization at European level: 
only when Europarties (became able to) manage the political competition in the both political arena 
(electoral and legislative) the problem of political representation will be resolved and consequently 
democratic deficit too.  
  
                                                     
23
 Several researches showed a reasonable congruence in policy- positions between the European electorates and the EPGs 
especially in left- right dimension (Schmitt and Thomassen 2009; McElroy and Benoit 2010). This means that the 
aggregation process at EU level of 27 national electoral process produce an acceptable outcome in terms of political 
representation but, as Mair and Thomassen (2010) argued, this relatively positive conclusion refers to “the outcome of the 
process rather than to the process as such, and in this sense a full-fledged system of political representation at the 
European level would still require European political parties to compete for votes”.  
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APPENDIX A. Political Parties at European Level decision-making and autonomy during 1990s 
 PES EPP ELDR EFGP 
Congress Unanimity 
Absolute Majority 
but in practice 
unanimity 
Absolute Majority 
but in practice 
unanimity 
Qualified Majority 
but in practice 
unanimity 
Bureau/ Executive 
Committee 
Absolute Majority 
for administrative 
issues; Unanimity 
for political issues 
Absolute Majority 
for administrative 
issues; Unanimity 
for political issues 
Absolute Majority 
but in practice 
unanimity 
Qualified Majority 
but in practice 
unanimity 
Binding Decision No No No No 
Individual 
Membership 
No No No No 
Source: Political Parties at European Level statues. 
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